|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Commentary: Pakistan Faces Threat Of Talibanization Muhammad Tahir
The coalition government which took power following the February 18 parliamentary election has lasted just six months. Pakistan now faces not only a power vacuum and serious political instability, but also an economic downturn, energy and food shortages, increasing violence and, most worrying to the international community, a rise in insurgency. Possibly in reaction to that concern, or possibly in a bid to win support from world leaders, PPP co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari has finally taken a strong stance against the insurgents. Speaking to the BBC on August 24, Zardari called for a ban on the Tehrik-e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of over two dozen militant groups based in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Although Zardari currently holds no official position, the government went ahead and imposed such a ban on August 25. Announcing that decision, Rehman Malik, an adviser to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, said that all departments concerned, as well as the international community, have been formally notified of the ban, and that restrictions have been imposed on the movement of persons associated with the TTP, and their bank accounts have been frozen. But many political pundits doubt whether the ban will curtail the activities of the Pakistani Taliban as its spheres of operation are already out of state control and its leaders already on the wanted list, to say nothing of the fact that they maintain no bank accounts and have no links to other financial institutions. In the short term, the sole beneficiary from the ban is likely to be Zardari himself, who is seeking international support for his candidacy in the presidential election scheduled for September 6. There is no doubt, however, that the threat posed by the Taliban is serious and imminent. During the first three weeks of August, its members perpetrated five major suicide bombings that killed some 130 people, while the number of deaths from military operations in the tribal areas remains unclear. At the same time, tens of thousands of people are desperately leaving their towns in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), hundreds of them reportedly seeking shelter even in war-torn Afghanistan. Today the Taliban already controls practically the entire North West Frontier Province (NWFP) with the exception of the capital city, Peshawar, and threatens to take its war to the relatively modern and quiet cities of Lahore, Multan and Karachi. Since early August, the Taliban presence in Karachi has increased, particularly in the neighborhoods of Gulbahar, Nazimabad, Liaqatabad and the Shah Faisal colony, formerly a recruiting base for Kashmiri militant groups. Alarmed by that presence, the local Mutahida Qawmi Momen political party has called on its supporters to prepare to take action against the Talibanization of the city. The recent bloodshed in the highly-protected capital, Islamabad, together with attacks on foreign diplomatic missions, security forces and military installations, testifies to the Taliban's aggressive expansion throughout the country. Government officials, however, seem unable or too busy to focus on this problem. Instead, they tend to blame the previous government, and particularly the policies of former President Pervez Musharraf, for the deteriorating security situation in the country, while pledging a change in policy in dealing with the insurgents. But it remains unclear whether and how such a new policy would differ from that of Musharraf, and indeed whether the government has any strategy at all to tackle this problem. If such a strategy exists, it has not yet been made public. Defeating militants in the tribal areas is more important than ever, as these regions have become safe havens not only for those intending to fight the NATO-led force in neighbouring Afghanistan, but also for foreign fugitives and for criminals who use the name of the Taliban as a cover for criminal activities such as kidnapping. In a situation like this, announcing a ban on a militant group is a first step in the right direction, but it could well prove to be an example of the classic Pakistani ploy of seeking to reassure the international community rather than actually tackle the problem in hand. We should reserve judgement on the government's counter-insurgency strategy, because previous experience suggests that the real problem of Pakistan's civilian leadership is a lack of implementation and commitment, particularly with regard to militant groups. The TTP is by no means the first organization to be banned: dozens of groups have been banned in the past few years, but almost all of them are still active in tribal areas. Those areas also serve as a base for Kashmiri militants and thousands of Uzbek, Arab and Chechen Al-Qaeda supporters. At the same time, cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani security forces, including NATO-led foreign troops, has been unsatisfactory, helping the Taliban on both sides of the border to maintain contact and if necessary avoid or escape capture simply by crossing the border. That cooperation must to be regulated and made more effective if the current government is serious about combatting terror. The PML-N decision to quit the government not only compounds the uncertainty about that government's future, but could also directly impact its counter-insurgency strategy, given that the political survival of the PPP-P-led coalition requires the support of many minor parties, including some Islamic parties with close ties to the Taliban. At this critical juncture, politicians must act responsibly and avoid political battles that could further destabilize the situation. The government needs to focus on the real issues: the fight against extremism, maintaining political stability, and the foundering economy. If it fails to do so, Pakistan's future could be bleak. Source:- RFE/RL but the views expressed in this commentary are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL. |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||